The Psychology of Scarcity

On the Psychology of Scarcity: When Reminders of Resource Scarcity Promote Selfish (and Generous) Behavior 

Caroline Roux, Kelly Goldsmith & Andrea Bonezzi
Journal of Consumer Research, forthcoming
Abstract: Consumers often encounter reminders of resource scarcity. However, relatively little is known about the psychological processes that such reminders instantiate. In this article, we posit that reminders of resource scarcity activate a competitive orientation, which guides consumers’ decision making towards advancing their own welfare. Further, we reveal that this tendency can manifest in behaviors that appear selfish, but also in behaviors that appear generous, in conditions where generosity allows for personal gains. The current research thus offers a more nuanced understanding of why resource scarcity may promote behaviors that appear either selfish or generous in different contexts, and provides one way to reconcile seemingly conflicting prior findings.

Type I Phobia

Words have both denotative (rational, dictionary) definitions and connotative (emotional, vernacular) interpretations. So do suffixes. One such suffix that sports a denotative meaning a bit at odds with its connotative evocation is "-phobia."

A phobia is an extreme or irrational fear or aversion. A fear of going outside is a phobia on a calm, temperate day absent political or social unrest. But if there's a tornado warning or a riot happening, that sort of fear is justified—it's not a phobia.

I confess to being a bit of a natural stickler when it comes to medical diagnosis. It's no more cute or endearing to hear, "I check the lock three times whenever I leave the house, I'm so OCD" than it is to hear, "I could barely make it up the stairs this morning, I have such cancer." If you really have OCD, that's awful and debilitating, as it is if you actually have cancer. It seems just to me to either treat them both as sacred or both as profane. I don't see the virtue in discriminating.

But discriminate we do, which is why actual irrational terror of, say, spiders can get lumped in with brown-bag bigotry. Few bigots' distaste for homosexuals or Muslims or immigrants actually qualifies as a clinical condition, one that they need to seek treatment for.

For the most part, bigots don't need medication or extensive counseling. They just need a little humanity in their lives. Do yourself a rhetorical favor and make your language more euvoluntary. Drop the -phobia unless it's genuinely warranted. And if it is, consider helping the person in question find professional help. Phobias can be a dreadful burden.

Behavioral Economics and Voluntary Cocercion

Dan Ariely on discipline:


Good timing. Adam's piece this week is on prudence.

If you want a mechanism that discourages you from overeating, or from indulging in risky sexual activity, or from you-name-it, why not consider religion?

Libertarians may chafe a little at the suggestion that a church hierarchy imposes "voluntary" coercion, since church membership is quasi-coercive (with possible exceptions for anabaptist sects). And there are, of course, still selection effects for adherence: it still takes diligence to exercise virtuous behavior. Still, on the margin, organized religion seems like a fine, time-tested organization to help folks overcome their little daily irrationalities.

The two examples Ariely used are even classic examples straight out of the Middle Ages: gluttony and lust. Dear temperance, dear prudence,

Won't you come out and play?

Rational (Beauty) Expectations

Rational Expectations (RE) on a Post-It Note is a behavioral conjecture: people aren't systematically fooled. Folks can make honest mistakes given available evidence, but if you collect the random errors and average them, you arrive at the underlying Platonic Truth.

Mind you, when economists use RE as an analytical tool, they're making claims about economic variables (usually future prices), but the idea should extend well to anything with sufficient salience. If it's important enough to worry about, it's important enough to think clearly about.

The following video is evidence against everyday RE.



Photoshop (or even its predecessors, airbrushing, soft focus, lighting tricks et al) is no secret. The Internet-old "I can tell from the pixels" meme is laughably tired. Of course we all know that advertisers attempt to trick the eye, so we should be able to seamlessly ignore or discount the false evidence presented in print ads.

Right? Hello? Is this thing on?

It's "there ain't no way to hide your lyin' eyes", not "there ain't no way to digitally manipulate your lyin' eyes." Advertisers should be able to make entirely credible disclaimers that their altered photographs do not constitute fraud, since 1) everyone knows about Photoshop and 2) no explicit claims of "use our products to look like this" appear in beauty ads. It's up to the viewer to make the connection.

Is Photoshop coercive?

More interestingly, how the heck can it work? Not in the "lighten and smooth the skin, lift the breasts, tuck the tummy" sense, but how in the heck can ordinary folks fall for its obvious duplicity? Are the social tuning forks in our heads so easily warped that we set standards based on bs images in glossy magazines?

It sounds absurd to me when I think about it, but maybe that's just because my appearance occupies a relatively small sliver of my attention (as those of you who know me in person can attest). Perhaps if I identified more closely with beauty, I'd be singing a different tune.

But it's still unlikely that the refrain would include censorious intent. I'd prefer to encourage folks to be better Bayesians.

Morality and Social Science: Time, Money, Ethics

Time, Money, and Morality 
Francesca Gino & Cassie Mogilner 
Psychological Science, forthcoming

Abstract: Money, a resource that absorbs much daily attention, seems to be involved in much unethical behavior, which suggests that money itself may corrupt. This research examined a way to offset such potentially deleterious effects - by focusing on time, a resource that tends to receive less attention than money but is equally ubiquitous in daily life. Across four experiments, we examined whether shifting focus onto time can salvage individuals' ethicality. We found that implicitly activating the construct of time, rather than money, leads individuals to behave more ethically by cheating less. We further found that priming time reduces cheating by making people reflect on who they are. Implications for the use of time primes in discouraging dishonesty are discussed.

Money, Moral Transgressions, and Blame 
Wenwen Xie et al. 
Journal of Consumer Psychology, forthcoming

Abstract: Two experiments tested participants' attributions for others' immoral behaviors when conducted for more versus less money. We hypothesized and found that observers would blame wrongdoers more when seeing a transgression enacted for little rather than a lot of money, and that this would be evident in observers' hand-washing behavior. Experiment 1 used a cognitive dissonance paradigm. Participants (N = 160) observed a confederate lie in exchange for either a relatively large or small monetary payment. Participants blamed the liar more in the small (versus large) money condition. Participants (N = 184) in Experiment 2 saw images of someone knocking over another to obtain a small, medium, or large monetary sum. In the small (versus large) money condition, participants blamed the perpetrator (money) more. Hence, participants assigned less blame to moral wrong-doers, if the latter enacted their deed to obtain relatively large sums of money. Small amounts of money accentuate the immorality of others' transgressions.

Dirty Money: Morality is Endogenous?

Diverging Effects of Clean Versus Dirty Money on Attitudes, Values, and Interpersonal Behavior

Qing Yang et al.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming

Abstract:
Does the cue of money lead to selfish, greedy, exploitative behaviors or to fairness, exchange, and reciprocity? We found evidence for both, suggesting that people have both sets of meaningful associations, which can be differentially activated by exposure to clean versus dirty money. In a field experiment at a farmers' market, vendors who handled dirty money subsequently cheated customers, whereas those who handled clean money gave fair value (Experiment 1). In laboratory studies with economic games, participants who had previously handled and counted dirty money tended toward selfish, unfair practices — unlike those who had counted clean money or dirty paper, both of which led to fairness and reciprocity. These patterns were found with the trust game (Experiment 2), the prisoner's dilemma (Experiment 4), the ultimatum game (Experiment 5), and the dictator game (Experiment 6). Cognitive measures indicated that exposure to dirty money lowered moral standards (Experiment 3) and reduced positive attitudes toward fairness and reciprocity (Experiments 6–7), whereas exposure to clean money had the opposite effects. Thus, people apparently have 2 contradictory sets of associations (including behavioral tendencies) to money, which is a complex, powerful, and ubiquitous aspect of human social life and cultural organization.

From Kevin Lewis