Showing posts with label origins of markets. Show all posts
Showing posts with label origins of markets. Show all posts
Friday, December 16, 2011
Markets in Body Parts: Podcast
In this Kosmos Podcast, the controversial Dr. James Stacey Taylor, author of Stakes and Kidneys: Why Markets in Human Body Parts Are Morally Imperative, dives into the philosophical and moral details of the recent court decision legalizing compensation for bone marrow donations. Dr. Taylor (shockingly) thinks this is a good result for everyone involved, and provides an outlook for markets in organs in the near future.
Thursday, November 10, 2011
Avner Greif and "Coercion-constraining Institutions"
Interesting paper by the always interesting Avner Greif: Coercion and Exchange: How Did Markets Evolve?
Abstract: What causes distinct trajectories of market development? Why did the modern market economy, characterized by impersonal exchange, first emerge in the West? This paper presents a theory of market development and evaluates it based on the histories of England, China, and Japan. The analysis focuses on how distinct coercion-constraining institutions that secure property rights differentially interact with contract enforcement institutions. Although different combinations of coercion-constraining and contract-enforcement institutions can support markets, only some coercion-constraining institutions and institutions enforcing impersonal exchange can be an equilibrium. Among the analysis’ insights are the relations between the internal organization of the state and legal development, and why impersonal exchange and political representation historically co-emerged.
Abstract: What causes distinct trajectories of market development? Why did the modern market economy, characterized by impersonal exchange, first emerge in the West? This paper presents a theory of market development and evaluates it based on the histories of England, China, and Japan. The analysis focuses on how distinct coercion-constraining institutions that secure property rights differentially interact with contract enforcement institutions. Although different combinations of coercion-constraining and contract-enforcement institutions can support markets, only some coercion-constraining institutions and institutions enforcing impersonal exchange can be an equilibrium. Among the analysis’ insights are the relations between the internal organization of the state and legal development, and why impersonal exchange and political representation historically co-emerged.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)